Saturday, 2 November 2013
America's Cup Observations
It's clear that the AC/72 boats represent the most significant advances in yacht racing in a generation. While small boats like the Moth have been foiling for years and other large multihulls have been using foils that are adjustable for cant and rake, the 72's are arguably the first to combine foils, wing masts and sophisticated foil control systems in in a truly competitive package. It is also important to note that there were no significant gear failures during the regatta. That is a testament to the highly developed design, engineering and testing programs of both teams. I think this bodes well for the future of the Cup competition. Once again, I have to confess that before the event I was among those who felt that this event could very well be a dismal failure. After witnessing the spectacular racing I changed my mind in this regard.
I watched every minute of the racing on TV and think it was extremely well presented. Journeyman sports announcer Todd Harris did good job in spite of having no real yacht racing experience. Sure, he made a few goofy comments but he also frequently acknowledged his lack of experience in the sport and didn't try to come across as an expert. I thought that was a refreshing departure from previous AC announcers. NBC relied on a cast of true sailing experts to deliver insightful commentary and I thought they all combined to deliver a quality sporting product.
What about the crews? Without access to the inner workings of each team we can only speculate on what occurred within them as the regatta progressed, but the indications are that the American team had not spent nearly as many hours on the water, in the boat they would race in the finals, as the Kiwis did. This became glaringly apparent when a Team Oracle crewman fell overboard before the start of the first race. Another interesting facet of the American team was the body language of two key members of their afterguard, John Kostecki and Tom Slingsby. We don't know what that interpersonal relationship was like but it was obvious that things improved when Kostecki was replaced by Ben Ainsley. This is not to take anything away from Kostecki as he has had a long and illustrious career as a professional sailor. But sometimes personalities don't mesh regardless of the skills and talents of the individuals and perhaps that's all there was to it. In any case, the shift from Kostecki to Ainsley made a significant difference and in my opinion was a key factor in Oracle's eventual victory.
It was compelling personal drama to see the juxtaposition of confidence in the two crews as Oracle began racking up wins against the Kiwis who came within a few puffs of wind of winning the event when race 13 was abandoned with the ENZ ahead with less than a mile to the finish line. When that race was re-sailed later in the day, the Americans began their improbable march to 9 points and the Cup. As the Kiwis suffered loss after loss their confidence was replaced first by concern, then worry and finally desperation. At the end of the event the strain and despair were evident on the faces of the ENZ team, especially that of Dean Barker, whose helmsmanship could not be faulted except on the starting line where he was frequently bested by Spithill. The Kiwis made few tactical errors and only one glaring boathandling error when they nearly capsized.
It was also interesting to see how the Americans continued to improve daily while the Kiwis seemed to remain constant in terms of boatspeed. I can only attribute that to the fact that Oracle was the faster boat and it took several races for the Americans to learn how to sail it to its optimum potential, while the Kiwis had the slower boat and couldn't get much more out of her.
In the aftermath of the event, Team Oracle accepted the challenge from an Australian group for the next America's Cup competition. We don't know what kind of boats that regatta will be sailed in, but given the spectacular racing we witnessed in AC XXXIV, I'm looking forward to some incredible technological advances and exciting racing in the event to come.
I watched every minute of the racing on TV and think it was extremely well presented. Journeyman sports announcer Todd Harris did good job in spite of having no real yacht racing experience. Sure, he made a few goofy comments but he also frequently acknowledged his lack of experience in the sport and didn't try to come across as an expert. I thought that was a refreshing departure from previous AC announcers. NBC relied on a cast of true sailing experts to deliver insightful commentary and I thought they all combined to deliver a quality sporting product.
What about the crews? Without access to the inner workings of each team we can only speculate on what occurred within them as the regatta progressed, but the indications are that the American team had not spent nearly as many hours on the water, in the boat they would race in the finals, as the Kiwis did. This became glaringly apparent when a Team Oracle crewman fell overboard before the start of the first race. Another interesting facet of the American team was the body language of two key members of their afterguard, John Kostecki and Tom Slingsby. We don't know what that interpersonal relationship was like but it was obvious that things improved when Kostecki was replaced by Ben Ainsley. This is not to take anything away from Kostecki as he has had a long and illustrious career as a professional sailor. But sometimes personalities don't mesh regardless of the skills and talents of the individuals and perhaps that's all there was to it. In any case, the shift from Kostecki to Ainsley made a significant difference and in my opinion was a key factor in Oracle's eventual victory.
It was compelling personal drama to see the juxtaposition of confidence in the two crews as Oracle began racking up wins against the Kiwis who came within a few puffs of wind of winning the event when race 13 was abandoned with the ENZ ahead with less than a mile to the finish line. When that race was re-sailed later in the day, the Americans began their improbable march to 9 points and the Cup. As the Kiwis suffered loss after loss their confidence was replaced first by concern, then worry and finally desperation. At the end of the event the strain and despair were evident on the faces of the ENZ team, especially that of Dean Barker, whose helmsmanship could not be faulted except on the starting line where he was frequently bested by Spithill. The Kiwis made few tactical errors and only one glaring boathandling error when they nearly capsized.
It was also interesting to see how the Americans continued to improve daily while the Kiwis seemed to remain constant in terms of boatspeed. I can only attribute that to the fact that Oracle was the faster boat and it took several races for the Americans to learn how to sail it to its optimum potential, while the Kiwis had the slower boat and couldn't get much more out of her.
In the aftermath of the event, Team Oracle accepted the challenge from an Australian group for the next America's Cup competition. We don't know what kind of boats that regatta will be sailed in, but given the spectacular racing we witnessed in AC XXXIV, I'm looking forward to some incredible technological advances and exciting racing in the event to come.
Wednesday, 30 October 2013
America's Cup: Lessons Learned
Apologies for the long hiatus from this blog. It's been a very busy six weeks since my last post, with several projects completed on Finisterra. But first we need to consider the AC regatta and lessons we can take from the racing and the boats themselves, and what this incredible event might mean for the future of the competition.
The boats:
1. It appears that Team Oracle really did have the better boat. I had thought that the bows might be too fine, lacking sufficient buoyancy to support the wing mast. But the designers and crew were able to keep the boat on it's feet throughout the event. The Kiwis chose another route with fuller, more buoyant bows. Perhaps in a bit more swell that would have paid off, but it is clear that the Yanks had the faster boat for the conditions they encountered. This is an indication that Team Oracle's designers had a better feel for the expected conditions on the bay and did a better job of targeting their boat for them, while the Kiwis opted for perhaps more of a safety margin in their bows and paid the price with more weight and windage up forward. This would cost them speed especially on the upwind legs.
2. Deck layouts for both boats showed significant differences. The most striking of which were the airfoils mounted on the aft cross beam of ENZ. There was a price to pay for them in terms of weight and drag and I think it's doubtful that they did enough to smooth out the wind vortices swirling off the boat to offset the negative factors. The Kiwis seemed to have a more efficient winch layout, but I noticed in the later races there were times when grinders weren't in the cockpit but grinding from a position on the trampoline instead. This was an indication to me that the crew was getting a bit rattled as they racked up loss after loss.
3. Much has been said about the fact that the tactician aboard Oracle had to grind winches on each tack or jibe while his counterpart on ENZ was able to keep his head out of the boat more and focus exclusively on tactics and strategy. This was more than offset by the addition of a strategist aboard Oracle. The early races showed that communication between tactician, strategist and helmsman would be crucial and it looked like ENZ had the better operational arrangement. However, once Ben Ainsley replaced John Kostecki those lines of communication improved drastically and it was beautiful to see how well Oracle's afterguard worked together, and this was a key factor in Oracle's string of victories.
4. There were other design features in the boats that probably made a difference. For example the helms on Oracle were angled inward a few degrees. This probably resulted in better ergonomics for the helmsman than the directly forward facing helms aboard ENZ.
5. As far as I could tell, the daggerboards were roughly the same but of course I don't know what the actual foil sections were. Another area of vital importance is the board control systems. We don't really know what the differences were and which worked best at raising and lowering them. Nor do we know which system worked best for adjusting cant and rake of the boards. Of course we can infer that Oracle's worked better since they won but it would be fascinating to see side-by-side comparisons of these systems.
I'll write more about the actual racing in a later post.
The boats:
1. It appears that Team Oracle really did have the better boat. I had thought that the bows might be too fine, lacking sufficient buoyancy to support the wing mast. But the designers and crew were able to keep the boat on it's feet throughout the event. The Kiwis chose another route with fuller, more buoyant bows. Perhaps in a bit more swell that would have paid off, but it is clear that the Yanks had the faster boat for the conditions they encountered. This is an indication that Team Oracle's designers had a better feel for the expected conditions on the bay and did a better job of targeting their boat for them, while the Kiwis opted for perhaps more of a safety margin in their bows and paid the price with more weight and windage up forward. This would cost them speed especially on the upwind legs.
2. Deck layouts for both boats showed significant differences. The most striking of which were the airfoils mounted on the aft cross beam of ENZ. There was a price to pay for them in terms of weight and drag and I think it's doubtful that they did enough to smooth out the wind vortices swirling off the boat to offset the negative factors. The Kiwis seemed to have a more efficient winch layout, but I noticed in the later races there were times when grinders weren't in the cockpit but grinding from a position on the trampoline instead. This was an indication to me that the crew was getting a bit rattled as they racked up loss after loss.
3. Much has been said about the fact that the tactician aboard Oracle had to grind winches on each tack or jibe while his counterpart on ENZ was able to keep his head out of the boat more and focus exclusively on tactics and strategy. This was more than offset by the addition of a strategist aboard Oracle. The early races showed that communication between tactician, strategist and helmsman would be crucial and it looked like ENZ had the better operational arrangement. However, once Ben Ainsley replaced John Kostecki those lines of communication improved drastically and it was beautiful to see how well Oracle's afterguard worked together, and this was a key factor in Oracle's string of victories.
4. There were other design features in the boats that probably made a difference. For example the helms on Oracle were angled inward a few degrees. This probably resulted in better ergonomics for the helmsman than the directly forward facing helms aboard ENZ.
5. As far as I could tell, the daggerboards were roughly the same but of course I don't know what the actual foil sections were. Another area of vital importance is the board control systems. We don't really know what the differences were and which worked best at raising and lowering them. Nor do we know which system worked best for adjusting cant and rake of the boards. Of course we can infer that Oracle's worked better since they won but it would be fascinating to see side-by-side comparisons of these systems.
I'll write more about the actual racing in a later post.
Wednesday, 18 September 2013
Americas Cup: The Plot Thickens
Just when we thought the Kiwis owned this regatta, the Yanks stepped up. As I mentioned previously, team Oracle is still on the steep part of the learning curve. They apparently took a giant stride forward over the last few days and the race results show it. Of course they still have a very steep hill to climb if they want to keep the Cup, but they are definitely improving their boatspeed, tactics and boat handling.
In race 8 team Oracle showed improved upwind boatspeed, but more important than that, they tacked much more efficiently than before. In previous races Oracle lost out to the Kiwis on nearly every tack but this time they held onto them on leg three. Near the top of that leg ETNZ, on port tack could not cross the starboard tack Oracle and attempted to tack under them, nearly capsizing in the process. This rare boathandling mistake cost them the race and came near taking them out of the regatta altogether. No one knows if they would have won this race if not for the blown tack but the key point of this race is that Oracle managed to up their game and breathe some life into their chances.
With the next race canceled due to high winds, both teams retired to their respective corners, one to review what went wrong, the other to continue their climb up the learning curve. When race 9 got underway the next day, the Yanks showed that 8 was not a fluke. They won the start and led ETNZ at every mark.
Race 10 was a spectacular display of yacht racing. The American boat won the start but couldn't quite slam the door on the Kiwis at mark one and trailed on the run. It was on the next beat that we were treated to a tacking duel that no one prior to the event would have predicted. It was an awesome spectacle of high speed sailing, split second timing and superb boathandling. Rounding opposite marks at the windward gate the two boats split to opposite sides of the course and jibed back toward each other with ETNZ on starboard. This was a situation that has never happened before, two boats hurtling down the course at 40 knots, approaching each other on a collision course. Oracle opted to slow down and take the stern of the Kiwi boat. At this speed, the result was a 200 meter advantage for ETNZ and that was all they needed to take the race. Was the slowdown the right choice? I think that, given the situation, it was probably a better option than gybing on top of the Kiwis and getting pinned outside at the leeward mark. The question is how far ahead does the tactician have to think in order to make this the right decision. At 40 knots, the Kiwis were a long way off thirty seconds before the cross, but that's about when the decision to take their stern needed to be executed. This is sailing on a whole new level, the ultimate high speed chess game where the stakes include putting the lives of the crew on the line. Intense!
In race 8 team Oracle showed improved upwind boatspeed, but more important than that, they tacked much more efficiently than before. In previous races Oracle lost out to the Kiwis on nearly every tack but this time they held onto them on leg three. Near the top of that leg ETNZ, on port tack could not cross the starboard tack Oracle and attempted to tack under them, nearly capsizing in the process. This rare boathandling mistake cost them the race and came near taking them out of the regatta altogether. No one knows if they would have won this race if not for the blown tack but the key point of this race is that Oracle managed to up their game and breathe some life into their chances.
With the next race canceled due to high winds, both teams retired to their respective corners, one to review what went wrong, the other to continue their climb up the learning curve. When race 9 got underway the next day, the Yanks showed that 8 was not a fluke. They won the start and led ETNZ at every mark.
Race 10 was a spectacular display of yacht racing. The American boat won the start but couldn't quite slam the door on the Kiwis at mark one and trailed on the run. It was on the next beat that we were treated to a tacking duel that no one prior to the event would have predicted. It was an awesome spectacle of high speed sailing, split second timing and superb boathandling. Rounding opposite marks at the windward gate the two boats split to opposite sides of the course and jibed back toward each other with ETNZ on starboard. This was a situation that has never happened before, two boats hurtling down the course at 40 knots, approaching each other on a collision course. Oracle opted to slow down and take the stern of the Kiwi boat. At this speed, the result was a 200 meter advantage for ETNZ and that was all they needed to take the race. Was the slowdown the right choice? I think that, given the situation, it was probably a better option than gybing on top of the Kiwis and getting pinned outside at the leeward mark. The question is how far ahead does the tactician have to think in order to make this the right decision. At 40 knots, the Kiwis were a long way off thirty seconds before the cross, but that's about when the decision to take their stern needed to be executed. This is sailing on a whole new level, the ultimate high speed chess game where the stakes include putting the lives of the crew on the line. Intense!
Friday, 13 September 2013
Installing a Chain Stopper
A while back I installed a Lewmar chain stopper on the foredeck to make anchoring a bit easier. It was a simple job to fashion a mounting block out of teak, make a backing plate out of apitong and bolt it all together. The job was done in a day. Then I went out and anchored and discovered that if I left it as is, the stopper would soon knock all the galvanizing off the chain. This is a standard flapper type chain stopper, rated at 5,000 lb SWL and sized for 5/16 chain. I had used this unit on my last boat, which had 1/4" chain and a vertical capstan windlass, and it worked well. The problem is that there is barely enough clearance in the stopper for the chain to pass through, and only if it is perfectly aligned and set at an angle that matches the angle of the chain as it passes from the windlass to the roller. On top of that, the deck in that area is only about half an inch thick. It is made of a fairly heavy fiberglass laminate and a bit of wood core. This isn't really enough structure to simply throughbolt the stopper to, so I added a carbon fiber top plate and a larger wood backing plate to bring it up to snuff. The photos below outline the process.
 |
| Mold. |
First I measured the amount of crown in the deck forward of the anchor locker. It's nearly flat but I wanted the edges of the top plate to fit tightly to the deck so I created a bit of extra curvature in the mold, which is made of a piece of old 1/4" Starboard.
 |
| Paper pattern with pre-cut carbon fiber |
I took a template off the deck and drew the shape in AutoCad. I wanted the top plate to be fairly large so I could attach it to the deck with several widely spaced fasteners to spread the loads out as much as possible. The rectangular shape is the outline of the teak mounting block.
 |
| Laminating the carbon fiber |
 |
| Second layer is rotated 45 degrees |
I oriented the first and fourth layers so the fibers run at 0 and 90 degrees to the centerline of the boat and rotated the second and third 45 degrees to provide strength in all directions. I used WEST systems resin which works really well for hand laminating projects.
 |
| Finishing the top plate |
After the plate was laminated and cured, I glued another copy of the paper pattern to it so I could precisely locate all the holes. It was a simple matter to drill and countersink them exactly where they need to be.
 |
| Top plate ready for finish sanding and paint |
 |
| Check fitting the hardware |
 |
| Finished part installed |
I made a backing plate out of 1" thick apitong that extends out to the bulwarks to help spread the loads as much as possible. The 10" cleat allows for a snubber to be run out over the port bow roller. I found that if I take a turn around the roller with the snubber, it won't jump off if it when the boat swings at anchor.
 |
| Chain and snubber geometry works |
 |
| 55 LB Rocna just fits |
America's Cup Day Four: Removal of Doubt
It was no surprise that Kostecki got the hook. Team Oracle has nothing if not a lot of depth on their bench and Ben Ainslie is certainly a qualified tactician. But it was also no surprise that they achieved the same result with the new guy. Oracle is sailing scared. If they get ahead of TNZ they are nervous that they'll get passed. If they get behind, they have no confidence that they can pass. This sets them up for mistakes, and they have certainly committed more than enough to send the Cup back to NZ.
In race 6, Oracle won the start and the first run. But then they were so concerned about getting rolled that they failed to stick to a winning strategy. They went around the wrong mark at the leeward gate and that pretty much sealed their fate. Out of phase with the tide and their competition, they struggled to get back over to the right side of the track only to have TNZ pummel them all the way to the weather mark. By then it was over.
It was only a matter of time before TNZ would win a start. In race 7 they did that and simply never looked back. I don't know exactly how many practice days team Oracle has had, with or without Ainslie, but it's pretty clear that they have not had the same amount as the Kiwis. It looks to me like the Oracle crew is still on the steep part of the learning curve while TNZ is certainly well beyond that stage. Perhaps Oracle's crash last October took too much of a toll in terms of sailing days for the crew. Perhaps there is too much internecine friction within the command structure at team Oracle. Whatever it is, this team is not living up to its potential. The betting now is whether Team Oracle can win even one more race before the Cup is shipped to Auckland.
In race 6, Oracle won the start and the first run. But then they were so concerned about getting rolled that they failed to stick to a winning strategy. They went around the wrong mark at the leeward gate and that pretty much sealed their fate. Out of phase with the tide and their competition, they struggled to get back over to the right side of the track only to have TNZ pummel them all the way to the weather mark. By then it was over.
It was only a matter of time before TNZ would win a start. In race 7 they did that and simply never looked back. I don't know exactly how many practice days team Oracle has had, with or without Ainslie, but it's pretty clear that they have not had the same amount as the Kiwis. It looks to me like the Oracle crew is still on the steep part of the learning curve while TNZ is certainly well beyond that stage. Perhaps Oracle's crash last October took too much of a toll in terms of sailing days for the crew. Perhaps there is too much internecine friction within the command structure at team Oracle. Whatever it is, this team is not living up to its potential. The betting now is whether Team Oracle can win even one more race before the Cup is shipped to Auckland.
Tuesday, 10 September 2013
Americas Cup Day 3: Disaster for Oracle
It was a beautiful day on the Bay, with plenty of wind and lots of current at the start of the day's racing. These were perfect conditions for the local boys to show the Kiwis about racing on San Francisco Bay. It was TNZ's turn to enter the starting box first and they should have had the advantage, but Oracle was able to maneuver into reasonably good position just to weather of TNZ when the starting flag dropped. They accelerated faster than TNZ which was not able to establish an overlap at the first mark. Oracle looked good on that short reach, showing better straight line boatspeed and rounded clear ahead of TNZ. They maintained their lead all the way to the leeward mark. They came in on starboard tack with a comfortable lead and should have simply rounded the mark and hardened up onto a starboard beat and left it to TNZ to tack, and then keep a loose cover on them. Instead, someone in the back of the boat decided to round the mark and tack immediately. Disaster!
Anyone who has ever sailed a catamaran knows they are slow to tack. When you round a leeward mark you want to at least get back up to speed before you throw the helm over. Somehow, the brain trust aboard Oracle forgot this basic rule. So they rounded the mark and tacked all in the same maneuver, and in that moment they gave up their lead, Their thinking was that it was better to stay on the right hand side of the course to avoid the adverse current of the flood tide. Bad thinking. The first rule of yacht racing is to stay between your competition and the next mark. In a colossal brain-fade, the afterguard aboard Oracle ignored this rule and suffered the consequences. TNZ rounded the mark, hardened up on starboard tack and made short work of Oracle's lead. At the first cross they were on port tack and ducked. On the next cross they were well ahead. After that there was no doubt as to who would win this race.
I've sailed many thousands of miles as tactician and made more dumb moves than I can count, so I know how the crew of Oracle feels. In match racing it can be one bad move and your day is over, and if you still have several legs to race, that feeling of self inflicted wounds only grows. Oracle served this race up to the Kiwis on a silver platter and they knew it at the first cross, if not before. I can imagine the crew muttering under their breath as the were grinding in the sheets on that tack. I'm sure the Kiwis were only too glad to snatch this race from the faltering grasp of the Yanks. It was so bad that Team Oracle decided to use their "postponement card" and skip race two today. Watching the body language on that boat, it was clear that this crew was demolished today, and it was probably a good decision for them to bail. Another pounding like that would have been devastating.
So the question is whether Team Oracle has it in them to come out on Thursday and make a race of it. I think this goes to the psychology of the game of yacht racing. Their boat is fast enough. I've heard talk that it's more complicated to sail than the Kiwi boat. Actually, all boats are more complicated to sail until the crew has practiced enough to make all the maneuvers look easy. If Oracle had another six months to sail the boat, all the maneuvers would go flawlessly. However, it's possible that a demoralized crew can start thinking they are riding the slower horse and that can become a self fulfilling prophecy. If they don't fix that now, the crew will begin to expect the other guy to beat them. So the gang at Team Oracle needs to do three things if they want salvage this regatta:
1. Stop going the wrong way.
2. Keep the psychology of the crew from surrendering to defeat.
3. Make sure their strategy is one that can win, and make better tactical decisions.
Once again, I have to say that I am surprised at how tactics rather than simply nailing the start have been the deciding factor thus far in the regatta.
Anyone who has ever sailed a catamaran knows they are slow to tack. When you round a leeward mark you want to at least get back up to speed before you throw the helm over. Somehow, the brain trust aboard Oracle forgot this basic rule. So they rounded the mark and tacked all in the same maneuver, and in that moment they gave up their lead, Their thinking was that it was better to stay on the right hand side of the course to avoid the adverse current of the flood tide. Bad thinking. The first rule of yacht racing is to stay between your competition and the next mark. In a colossal brain-fade, the afterguard aboard Oracle ignored this rule and suffered the consequences. TNZ rounded the mark, hardened up on starboard tack and made short work of Oracle's lead. At the first cross they were on port tack and ducked. On the next cross they were well ahead. After that there was no doubt as to who would win this race.
I've sailed many thousands of miles as tactician and made more dumb moves than I can count, so I know how the crew of Oracle feels. In match racing it can be one bad move and your day is over, and if you still have several legs to race, that feeling of self inflicted wounds only grows. Oracle served this race up to the Kiwis on a silver platter and they knew it at the first cross, if not before. I can imagine the crew muttering under their breath as the were grinding in the sheets on that tack. I'm sure the Kiwis were only too glad to snatch this race from the faltering grasp of the Yanks. It was so bad that Team Oracle decided to use their "postponement card" and skip race two today. Watching the body language on that boat, it was clear that this crew was demolished today, and it was probably a good decision for them to bail. Another pounding like that would have been devastating.
So the question is whether Team Oracle has it in them to come out on Thursday and make a race of it. I think this goes to the psychology of the game of yacht racing. Their boat is fast enough. I've heard talk that it's more complicated to sail than the Kiwi boat. Actually, all boats are more complicated to sail until the crew has practiced enough to make all the maneuvers look easy. If Oracle had another six months to sail the boat, all the maneuvers would go flawlessly. However, it's possible that a demoralized crew can start thinking they are riding the slower horse and that can become a self fulfilling prophecy. If they don't fix that now, the crew will begin to expect the other guy to beat them. So the gang at Team Oracle needs to do three things if they want salvage this regatta:
1. Stop going the wrong way.
2. Keep the psychology of the crew from surrendering to defeat.
3. Make sure their strategy is one that can win, and make better tactical decisions.
Once again, I have to say that I am surprised at how tactics rather than simply nailing the start have been the deciding factor thus far in the regatta.
Monday, 9 September 2013
Americas Cup: Surprises Abound
1. Oracle looked sloppy when a crewman fell overboard before the first start. No surprise there. It's not uncommon for the defender to be rusty early in the series. Without a competitive qualification series against serious competition, defenders often fail to develop the competitive reflexes and instincts that challengers which have struggled through an elimination series have developed.
2. TNZ showed up with their A game. Oracle did not.
3. The word around the yacht club bars was that TNZ had the faster boat. It sure looked that way in the first three races. But maybe that's not so. Oracle showed flashes of boatspeed, but was foiled by poor boat handling and tactical errors in the first three races. They showed something different in race four.
4. A huge surprise was the series of tactical errors Oracle made in the early going. On the other hand it was beautiful to see how they learned from the early races, adapted and found a way to win in race four.
5. Another surprise was how both crews handled the 72's as if they were dinghies. They both showed that they can create opportunities to pass. This is probably the biggest surprise of the event.
6. Conventional wisdom states that the faster boat will win. Why is that? Well, first of all it's incredibly demoralizing to be on a boat that you know doesn't have the straight line performance of the competition. On the other hand, it's just as empowering to know that your boat is faster than the competition. It gives you the confidence to sail more aggressively, take more risks for greater rewards.
7. It is also true that, all else being equal, he who makes the fewest mistakes wins. Oracle's early errors played a large part in handing three victories to TNZ. By the same token, TNZ had a few less than stellar moments and let race four get away from them.
8. Do not underestimate Kostecki. One thing you can be sure of is that the crew of Oracle learned a lot in the first four races and, more than anyone else, John Kostecki took the measure of TNZ. It was not a fluke that Oracle won race four.
9. With the 24 knot limit on windspeed, these boats will probably survive the entire series. Still, they are experiencing apparent winds of over forty knots on the upwind legs. I'm expecting more carnage before this event is over.
10. Contrary to popular opinion, including that of yours truly, this is turning into an exciting event and I am looking forward to tomorrow's racing!
2. TNZ showed up with their A game. Oracle did not.
3. The word around the yacht club bars was that TNZ had the faster boat. It sure looked that way in the first three races. But maybe that's not so. Oracle showed flashes of boatspeed, but was foiled by poor boat handling and tactical errors in the first three races. They showed something different in race four.
4. A huge surprise was the series of tactical errors Oracle made in the early going. On the other hand it was beautiful to see how they learned from the early races, adapted and found a way to win in race four.
5. Another surprise was how both crews handled the 72's as if they were dinghies. They both showed that they can create opportunities to pass. This is probably the biggest surprise of the event.
6. Conventional wisdom states that the faster boat will win. Why is that? Well, first of all it's incredibly demoralizing to be on a boat that you know doesn't have the straight line performance of the competition. On the other hand, it's just as empowering to know that your boat is faster than the competition. It gives you the confidence to sail more aggressively, take more risks for greater rewards.
7. It is also true that, all else being equal, he who makes the fewest mistakes wins. Oracle's early errors played a large part in handing three victories to TNZ. By the same token, TNZ had a few less than stellar moments and let race four get away from them.
8. Do not underestimate Kostecki. One thing you can be sure of is that the crew of Oracle learned a lot in the first four races and, more than anyone else, John Kostecki took the measure of TNZ. It was not a fluke that Oracle won race four.
9. With the 24 knot limit on windspeed, these boats will probably survive the entire series. Still, they are experiencing apparent winds of over forty knots on the upwind legs. I'm expecting more carnage before this event is over.
10. Contrary to popular opinion, including that of yours truly, this is turning into an exciting event and I am looking forward to tomorrow's racing!
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
.jpg)
